Georgetown University’s Newspaper of Record since 1920

The Hoya

Georgetown University’s Newspaper of Record since 1920

The Hoya

Georgetown University’s Newspaper of Record since 1920

The Hoya

The Definition of a Person is The Deciding Factor in the Moral Debate

The Definition of a Person is The Deciding Factor in the Moral Debate

By Adil Ahmad Haque

Moral questions are notoriously resistant to free and open discussion, largely because they tend to be emotionally charged and bring a host of personal, political, religious and metaphysical (in the proper, rather than the pejorative sense) commitments to bear on issues of immediate and practical concern. It is largely pure obstinance that motivates this writing, for I am of the opinion that it is precisely questions of the right and the good which command our attention and require the most thoughtful and respectful dialogue. It is my hope that the discussion below will contribute to a constructive, campus-wide conversation centered around the moral and legal issues surrounding abortion.

David Brodsky (“Weighing the Debate Over the Right to Life,” Jan.25, p.3) speaks of a fetus as possessing a right to life. It is my understanding that peopleare the only types of things which possess rights and bear responsibilities. People are distinguished from human bodies in several important respects, which may be only roughly approximated by the following terms, offered by Mary Anne Warren in her famous essay, “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion.”

In order for an entity to be considered a person, it must possess a consciousness of objects and events external and/or internal to the being and, in particular, the ability to feel pain. The ability to reason, the developed capacity to solve new and relatively complex problems and self-motivated activity, which is relatively independent of either genetic or direct external control, must also be present. The capacity to communicate by whatever means and the presence of self-concepts and self-awareness, either individual or racial, or both, are the final components classifying an entity as a person.

Corpses are not people; nor, I would contend, are fetuses in the early months of pregnancy. It is important to note that an entity need not exhibit all the above characteristics all the time in order to be considered a person; however, an early fetus is incapable of exhibiting any of the above characteristics at any time. Fetuses do begin to respond to external stimuli later in development; the question of whether this is indicative of anything more than the reflexive activities of its central nervous system can be put aside for the moment. If fetuses are not peopleand if only people posses rights and bear responsibilities, then fetuses lack the status which would designate them as proper objects of moral concern.

Even if fetuses were people, abortion would still be permissible. I am quite satisfied with the above analysis; many of you, I am sure, are not. So, let me address what I consider to be the counter-factual claim. Neither killing nor letting die are categorically impermissible. Few would argue that a woman faced with rape and murder acts unjustly in killing her assailant, assuming that less violent means are not ready at hand. Similarly, few would argue that one is obligated to donate one and one-half of one’s kidneys to a local hospital, even though it is possible for one to live with only the remaining half, and the other parts may be used to save as many as three lives.

Certainly, pacifism and organ donation are laudable and meritorious in many ways, but few would argue that they are morally required. Indeed, were an unwilling subject rendered unconscious and separated from her kidneys by force, most would agree that the subject had been wronged, that her rights had been violated. Which rights? The Supreme Court has taken to using the term “bodily integrity” as a stand-in for the moral claims at stake in such cases, and I see no reason not to entertain its use, at least on a provisional basis. It seems to me that, in the case of abortion, we see the same considerations at issue.

A woman has both a moral and a legal right to decide for herself the ends to which her body is to be used as a means. If the ends she chooses include sex, so be it; if she does not choose sex, and if sex is forced upon her, we have an instance of rape. If the ends she chooses include pregnancy, so be it; if she does not choose pregnancy, and if pregnancy is forced upon her, then we have an instance of unjust coercion.

Now, it is within a woman’s rights to terminate her pregnancy at any time she sees fit. Is a woman also within her rights in demanding the death of the fetus, if it might otherwise be preserved? I do not believe that she does, any more than a blood donor is within her rights in choosing how her blood is to be removed or to whom it will be given. This analogy exemplifies the complex moral questions inherent in the debate over abortion.

Adil Ahmad Haque is a sophomore in the College.

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