20 Years Later: Debunking Berlin Wall Theory
Nov. 9 marks two decades since the opening of East Germany to the West. Just a few days later, the Berlin Wall fell before euphoric crowds. Today, no one doubts the decisiveness of this moment in the story of communism’s collapse. But just as important as remembering the decisive moments is understanding how they came about, and here there is more than a little doubt and disagreement. The symbolic importance of communism’s downfall has only sharpened the tenor of historical debate. The debate’s byproducts, unfortunately, include some misleading accounts of the causes, and the significance, of the political transformation of the Soviet Union and its European satellites.
One such theory overly emphasizes the role of former President Reagan in facilitating the collapse. This view holds that the events of 1989 to 1991 represent the historic defeat of socialism by capitalism and not just any capitalism, but Milton Friedman-style libertarianism, the capitalism of Reagan and Margaret Thatcher.
The story goes something like this: The Soviet Union was foredoomed, long before any mention of perestroika, by the structural defects of its economy. In the contest between Soviet socialism and American capitalism, the Soviet Union just could not compete. And once Reagan, keenly assessing this fatal weakness, converted U.S. economic advantage into military superiority, the pressure on Soviet leaders to step down the path of reform (leading straight to capitalism) became irresistible. Enter Mikhail Gorbachev, exit socialism. The acts of dissidence and resistance, the democratic movements and parties that emerged as communism crumbled, were all premised on the conscious acceptance of America’s winning formula: open markets plus liberal democracy.
Proclaiming the historic triumph of capitalism, 1989 makes for an inspiring myth. But it’s just a myth. On closer inspection, the account is fraught with contradictions. Admitting of no nuance or contingency and dismissive of facts that don’t neatly fit its teleological schema, the Reaganite myth misrepresents history.
Consider the role played by Reagan in bringing about the transformations of the pre-collapse era. Of course, Reagan’s novel geopolitical strategies were of decisive importance. But if anything, their effect was to harden the Soviet Union’s resolve. Reagan’s reversal of detente, for instance, almost certainly contributed to the general crackdown on anti-communist dissidence during the early ’80s. And Reagan had no master plan to force the emergence of a reformist Soviet leader. On the contrary, he was elected on a platform of aggressive containment, based on the belief that Soviet communism was a monolithic system that could be neither reformed nor pacified. Only after Gorbachev’s rise was Reagan converted to more conciliatory policies.
In general, the Reaganite narrative focuses almost exclusively on the interaction of the two superpowers, neglecting a multiplicity of internal and international forces. The open discussion of democratization under Gorbachev could not have taken place without the Soviet dissident movement the decade before. And the dissidents would not have survived without the cover of international human rights law, guaranteed for the first time by the Helsinki Accords which Reagan vocally opposed on the grounds that they legitimized Soviet control of Eastern Europe.
Contrary to myth, the dissident cause was not capitalism but human rights. It comes as no surprise that the Reaganite narrative neglects the central role of independent trade unions in organizing and protecting workers from state repression. Everyone has heard of “Solidarity,” but many scholars postulate that trade unions played a far larger role in 1989, and indeed the whole history of anti-communist resistance, than is generally acknowledged. In Czechoslovakia, too, reformists demanded the right of workers to organize freely. The unions and factory councils that organized spontaneously during the Prague Spring of 1968 proved among the most determined centers of resistance to Soviet-backed “normalization.”
I could cite more examples, but the point is the Reaganite narrative is flawed not just in its details, but in its central contention, that “socialism” died with the Soviet Union. The free market rhetoric of the new post-communist governments might seem to support this world-historical judgment. In hindsight, though, it was mostly just rhetoric, revealing more about the depth of loathing of the Soviet system than about capitalism’s beatitudes. The hope that post-communist states would become “little Americas,” free market oases in a desert of European social democracy, was always a false one. The death of socialism, besides, is a trumpet that has been sounded many times before. In 1848, in the aftermath of an earlier revolutionary wave, the death of socialism was being proclaimed. If there is one sure lesson of 1989, it’s not that socialism is dead or that capitalism has triumphed; it’s that history is ill-suited to mythologizing. We can do better than the Reaganite narrative in understanding just what really happened in 1989.
Brendan McElroy is a sophomore in the College.
To send a letter to the editor on a recent campus issue or Hoya story or a viewpoint on any topic, contact opinion@thehoya.com. Letters should not exceed 300 words, and viewpoints should be between 600 to 800 words.
Nov 06 2009 at 11:00 a.m.
Were Reagan and capitalism 100% responsible for the fall of communism? No. But your article reads more like a summation of notes from an econ professor who does not like Reagan than actual insight.
Reagan pushed capitalism as a means by which to achieve human rights as those under communism rarely enjoy them. And by competing heavily with the Soviet Union, he may have hardeneded their stance... right into the ground.
I say that because it is good to see a sophomore in college with an Anglo surname clarify the situation in Eastern Europe during the fall of communism.
I especially love your insight into Czechoslovakia. My family and I may have defected from there in '84 (I should note my father served as part of the government so his insight may be a little more valid) and my relatives experienced the Prague Spring of '68 first hand. But I guess "postulating scholars" know a lot more about that time than my family. I do like the article because I never knew capitalism and Reagan were not the driving force for change but it was in fact "international trade unions" and Helsinki. I guess I must admit that the Finns and unions were particularly helpful to the Czechs during WWII and Soviet occupation.
And you are right about the repercussions of the fall of communism because the Czech Republic (and Slovakia along with it) is certainly not a free market with flat-tax rates and a leader (Klaus) who is the epitome of a free market advocate.
Once again, were Reagan and capitalism 100% responsible for the fall of communism? No. But were they among the most critical elements? Absolutely. But I guess first hand experiences pale in comparison to scholars and we should be sure to down play Reagan's importance as well as that of capitalism's.
Nov 06 2009 at 3:14 p.m.
This was really a very interesting piece. I am prone to disagree with its premise and to give more credit to the United State's use of leveraging its economic superiority and converting it to a military threat, but even though I disagree I am unprepared to support my conception as forcefully and thoughtfully as you have supported yours.
The Hoya should run more thoughtful stuff like this and less self-victimization and hate-baiting.
Thanks,
Saxon Gillis
Nov 08 2009 at 1:35 p.m.
It is worth noting that Reagan focused heavily on human rights. The distinction provided above between liberal free markets and human rights is ridiculous, no one spoke out more strongly than did the United States and its leader
Nov 09 2009 at 11:20 p.m.
"the dissident cause was not capitalism but human rights"
Same thing. Can't have human rights like life, liberty and property without a system that protects voluntary trade and allows people to keep the results of their productive efforts.
"The hope that post-communist states would become “little Americas,” free market oases in a desert of European social democracy, was always a false one."
And so Estonia's "Privatization Czar" and the flat tax systems of Ukraine, Estonia and the Czech Republic represent a regression to Socialism?
From Wikipedia: "A balanced budget, almost non-existent public debt, flat-rate income tax, free trade regime, fully convertible currency backed by currency board and a strong peg to the euro, competitive commercial banking sector,innovative e-Services and even mobile-based services are all hallmarks of Estonia's FREE-MARKET-BASED economy" [emphasis mine].
You write well, but you get the facts from your professors, which invariably leads you to false conclusions.
Nov 10 2009 at 8:48 p.m.
I'm glad that this article has stimulated some debate. Let me just address some confusions of the central point that I was trying to make, and then take on some of the counter-arguments.
First, I do not "get all the facts from my professors," though I'm indeed curious as to why this should make such facts necessarily wrong. Second, as for why the experience of living in Czechoslovakia during the 1980s should give one some special insight into the role that President Reagan played in bringing down the Soviet Union, I have no idea. I freely admit, of course, that I'm arguing about history in the same way that all history (by definition) is argued about -- from a distance.
In any case, there seem to be three basic misunderstandings of what I was trying to say here. First, the claim was made that I assigned virtually no importance whatsoever to President Reagan in bringing about the events of 1989. Second, there was my allegedly spurious distinction between "capitalism" and "human rights". Third, there was my supposed claim that the states of Eastern Europe were still, or were "regressing to," socialism.
To the first: Well, I plainly did not make such a claim. In fact, if you'll look back to the third paragraph, I even said that "Reagan's geopolitical strategies were of decisive importance." I simply think that there were important in a very different way than supporters of the "myth" typically claim that they were. What I was targeting, by seeking to reduce the attention given to Reagan, was the false belief that he had some kind of architectonic "master plan," which took into account all the contingencies, accidents, and serendipitous events of the '80s. Reagan was not a visionary in the sense so often described; he was a typical politician many of whose (foreign) policies happened to be effective. That is all I was saying.
To the second: Of course, among the human rights is the right not to be arbitrary stripped of one's property. I certainly don't have any objection to this. But to claim that, a priori, human rights will always be protected in a capitalist regime, but will always be violated in a socialist regime -- and so to collapse the distinction between capitalism and human rights -- is absurd. Incidentally, I am well aware that Reagan frequently used the language of human rights in his diplomatic initiatives. This, in fact, only strengthens my point -- that 1989 was an historic victory for human rights, not for "capitalism" per se.
Nov 10 2009 at 8:49 p.m.
(Continued)
To the third: My last paragraph contained two distinct claims, which, due to space limits, may seem to be blurred. The claims are, 1) Socialism did not die with the Soviet Union, and 2) Eastern European states did not become "little Americas" after the fall of communism. So the allegation that I mistakenly said that Eastern Europe was "regress[ing] to Socialism" is itself misguided.
As regards claim 2), I would just point out that the states of Eastern Europe have all implemented comprehensive welfare states, like those of Western Europe. Opinion polling, moreover, indicates that social democratic policies -- opposition to massive income inequality, a preference for national health insurance -- is just as strongly supported in the East as in the West. (I refer to: Zsuzsa Ferge, “Is there a specific East Central European Welfare Culture?”, in Peter Herrmann, ed., Governance and Social Professions: How Much Openness is Needed and How Much Openness is Possible [New York: Nova Science Publishers 2008].) This is quite far removed from American-style capitalism.
In sum, the purpose of the article was to highlight the contigencies and uncertainties of what happened in 1989, to get past the Manichean oppositions and just make a few contrary points. My ambitious went no further than this. Thanks to everyone for taking the time to read (and disagree!).